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ABSTRACT
Smart contracts are programs that manage digital assets according
to a certain protocol, expressing for instance the rules of an auction.
Understanding the possible behaviors of a smart contract is difficult,
which complicates development, auditing, and the post-mortem
analysis of attacks.
This paper presents the first specification mining technique for
smart contracts. Our technique extracts the possible behaviors of
smart contracts from contract executions recorded on a blockchain
and expresses them as finite automata. A novel dependency analy-
sis allows us to separate independent interactions with a contract.
Our technique tunes the abstractions for the automata construc-
tion automatically based on configurable metrics, for instance, to
maximize readability or precision. We implemented our technique
for the Ethereum blockchain and evaluated its usability on several
real-world contracts.
1 INTRODUCTION
Smart contracts are programs that store and automatically move
digital assets according to specified rules. While this idea was pro-
posed over 20 years ago [61], it only gained traction when it was
combined with blockchain technology to store an immutable record
of all contract executions. Smart contracts have a wide range of ap-
plications, including fund raising, securities trading and settlement,
supply-chain management, and electricity sourcing.
Despite their conceptual simplicity, understanding how to cor-
rectly interact with a smart contract is often challenging, not only
for developers but also auditors. Specifically, legal invocations of
contract operations typically need to satisfy implicit temporal order-
ing constraints, such as bidding only before an auction has ended.
As an additional complication, contract executions may have subtle
interactions (similar to data races) with each other when accessing
the same state, especially since the smart-contract execution model
provides no scheduling guarantees.
Specification mining [56] has been shown to help software en-
gineers understand behaviors of complex systems. In this paper,
we present the first application of specification mining to smart
contracts. Our technique can be used to understand a contract of
interest and its interactions with users and other smart contracts.
We mine these specifications from contract executions recorded on
a blockchain and express them as finite automata, describing the
observed sequences of interactions with the contract.
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Input: . . .
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Figure 1: An automaton generated by our technique.
The automata produced by our technique not only characterize
the protocol (API) for using a contract, but also shed light on tempo-
ral dependencies between different contract invocations that access
the same state. This is useful for understanding the functionality of
a smart contract, for debugging it, or even for a post-mortem analy-
sis of an attack. For instance, a bug in the Parity wallet [3] allowed
a function for setting the wallet owner to be called by anyone, even
after the wallet was constructed. As a result, attackers managed
to claim existing wallets by setting themselves as owners. In an
automaton generated by our technique, the contract invocation
for updating the wallet owner would appear as a transition that
may be taken even after the wallet construction, which would help
developers understand the attack.
Our approach goes beyond existing specification mining tech-
niques for classical execution environments in two major ways.
First, most techniques target interactions of sequential clients with
a data structure [56]. In contrast, on a blockchain it is common that
multiple clients interleave their interactions with a contract. To
obtain precise specifications, our approach uses a novel dependency
analysis to separate independent interactions with a contract and
extract self-contained sequential traces from the blockchain.
Second, existing mining techniques use fixed, built-in abstrac-
tions to extract automata from sets of traces, e.g., by only consid-
ering method signatures. To support a wide range of use cases,
our approach automatically adjusts its abstractions to maximize
configurable metrics. These metrics can, for instance, favor coarse
abstractions to obtain simple automata that are easy to grasp by a
contract client, or precise abstractions to facilitate accurate under-
standing by a human auditor.
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An example automaton that is generated by our technique is
shown in Fig. 1. This automaton represents part of the function-
ality of the ERC20 token standard [1], an API that allows clients
to create and manage their own crypto-currency using smart con-
tracts. The edge labels of the automaton correspond to contract
invocations. Specifically, function approve of contract instance A is
invoked by user U to give user V permission to withdraw assets
from U ’s account. Function transferFrom of the same contract in-
stance A is invoked byV to withdraw assets fromU ’s account after
U ’s permission has been granted. This functionality is depicted in
the automaton of Fig. 1 through relational abstractions that, for
example, express that the first parameter of transferFrom needs to
match the caller of approve. The notation ∗U and ∗V means that
U and V are assigned fresh values. Although there may be multi-
ple concrete instances of U and V , the automaton expresses that
transferFrom still expects the same instance of U and V as in the
previous invocation of approve, similarly to named capture groups
in regular expressions.
The automaton is readable because our dependency analysis
extracts self-contained interactions with the smart contract even
though the blockchain contains many (partly overlapping) inter-
actions. The abstractions applied here preserve relations between
parameters of the above contract invocations, but omit other infor-
mation, such as the value being approved and transferred or the
return values of the invocations.
Our work makes the following technical contributions:
1. We present the first application of specification mining to smart
contracts.
2. We propose a novel dependency analysis that handles multiple
interleaving interactions with a smart contract to extract self-
contained sequential traces (Sect. 4).
3. We present a novel automaton construction technique that auto-
matically tunes its abstractions to optimize configurable metrics
(Sect. 5).
4. We implemented our approach for the Ethereum blockchain
and demonstrated its usefulness on several real-world contracts
(Sect. 6).
2 BACKGROUND ON SMART CONTRACTS
A blockchain [54, 60, 62] is a decentralized consensus mechanism
that was introduced by Bitcoin [10, 27, 50]. More specifically, a
blockchain is a Byzantine fault-tolerant distributed database that
is replicated across a peer-to-peer network of nodes and stores
an ever-growing sequence of blocks, each uniquely identified by
an increasing block number. A subset of the network nodes act as
miners; they collect, in a block, a sequence of transactions, which
are broadcast to the network but have not yet been stored in the
blockchain. Transactions are created by user nodes of the network,
for example, to transfer crypto-assets between different parties,
and are communicated to the network. To earn the right to append
a block to the blockchain, a miner needs to solve a mathematical
challenge, in which case it permanently stores the block in the
blockchain with a link to the previous block.
In the last few years, there have emerged several general-use,
blockchain-based, distributed-computing platforms [13], the most
popular of which is Ethereum [6]. Ethereum is open source [2],
and its underlying crypto-currency is called ether. A key feature
of Ethereum is its support for contract accounts in addition to user
accounts. Like normal bank accounts, both contract and user ac-
counts store a balance in ether and are owned by a user. Both types
of accounts publicly reside on the Ethereum blockchain. A con-
tract account, however, is not directly managed by users, but rather
through code that is associated with it. Such code expresses con-
tractual agreements between users, for instance, to implement and
enforce an auction protocol. A contract account can also store per-
sistent state (in a dictionary) that the code may access, for instance,
to store auction bids. To better understand the process, imagine
that a user issues a transaction with the auction contract account
to place a bid. When this transaction is collected by a miner, the
code of the contract account is automatically executed and the bid
is recorded in the state of the account.
Contract accounts with their associated code and state are called
smart contracts. The code is written in a Turing-complete bytecode,
which is executed on the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) [67].
Of course, programmers do not typically write EVM code. They
can instead program in a variety of high-level languages, such as
Solidity, Serpent, or Vyper, which compile to EVM bytecode.
3 GUIDED TOUR
In this section, we illustrate the workflow and architecture of our
specification mining approach for smart contracts. Through a run-
ning example, we discuss the motivation behind the approach and
the stages of our technique.
Example. Fig. 2 shows a smart contract, written in Ethereum’s
Solidity, that implements multiple, concurrent rock-paper-scissors
games. The contract provides a public API consisting of functions
StartGame, Bet, and Claim.
Function StartGame initializes a game (line 13), specifying a pe-
riod of 4 blocks (via duration d), during which players may place
their bets, and returns the identifier of the new game (line 15). Func-
tion Bet requires the player to specify a game identifier gid, their
position p in the game (when p is 0, the player is requesting to be pA,
i.e., player A, and when p is 1, they want to be pB), and their hand h
(a hand of 1 is rock, 2 is paper, and 3 is scissors). Additionally, Bet
is a payable function that expects players to pay the bet amount
(line 20) within the first 4 blocks of the game (line 22). Function
Claim allows players to claim their winnings for a period of 4 blocks
following the betting period (lines 32–33), and transfers money to
the winner (lines 36, 39, 42, 46, and 49). Line 34 disallows players
from claiming their winnings multiple times by manipulating the
start of claims such that, after the first claim, it appears that the
claiming period is already over.
Workflow. Simple contracts such as our running example can be
understood by reading the source code. However, smart contracts
are typically much more complicated and their source code is of-
ten not available. To facilitate the understanding of even complex
contracts—and thereby their development, use, and auditing—we
mine specifications that characterize how contracts interact with
users and other contracts. For a given smart contract (the so-called
target contract), our technique determines these interactions by
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1 contract RockPaperScissors {
2 struct Game {
3 address pA; address pB; // players
4 uint hA; uint hB; // hands
5 uint cS; // claim start
6 }
7 uint constant d = 4; uint constant amnt = 42;
8 uint gC = 0; // game count
9 mapping(uint => Game) public games;
10
11 function StartGame () public returns (uint) {
12 gC++;
13 var g = Game(0, 0, 0, 0, block.number + d);
14 games[gC] = g;
15 return gC;
16 }
17
18 function Bet(uint gid , uint p, uint h) public payable {
19 require (0 < h && h < 4 && p < 2);
20 require(msg.value == amnt);
21 var g = games[gid];
22 require (0 < g.cS && block.number < g.cS);
23 if (g.hA == 0 && p == 0) {
24 g.pA = msg.sender; g.hA = h;
25 } else if (g.hB == 0 && p == 1) {
26 g.pB = msg.sender; g.hB = h;
27 } else { require(false); }
28 }
29
30 function Claim(uint gid) public {
31 var g = games[gid];
32 require (0 < g.cS && g.cS <= block.number);
33 require(block.number < g.cS + d);
34 g.cS = 0; // disallows multiple claims
35 if (g.hA == 0 && g.hB != 0) { // no player A
36 g.pB.transfer(amnt); return;
37 }
38 if (g.hB == 0 && g.hA != 0) { // no player B
39 g.pA.transfer(amnt); return;
40 }
41 if (g.hA == g.hB) { // draw
42 g.pA.transfer(amnt); g.pB.transfer(amnt);
43 return;
44 }
45 if (winningHand(g.hA, g.hB) == g.hB) {
46 g.pB.transfer (2 * amnt); return;
47 }
48 if (winningHand(g.hA, g.hB) == g.hA) {
49 g.pA.transfer (2 * amnt); return;
50 }
51 }
52 }
Figure 2: Running example written in Solidity.
mining actual executions that are recorded on the blockchain (ei-
ther the actual Ethereum blockchain or in a testing environment),
and describes them through a finite automaton. As shown in Fig. 3,
this process consists of two main steps, which we explain next.
Mining histories. Our technique captures all interactions with
the target contract starting from a given seed transaction, which
contains an invocation of the contract. In practice, the seed trans-
action typically instantiates the target contract—similarly to how
objects are instantiated in object-oriented programs—such that all
interactions with the contract are captured. Our technique locates
Seed transaction TS
History Mining
Automaton construction with abstraction tuning
Construction
Construct
automaton
Abstract
histories
Apply
moves
Sampling
User
candidate automaton Acand
new candidate
recipe Rcand
histories H0, . . . , Hn
automaton A from final recipe Ruser configuration
Figure 3: Overview of the workflow and tool architecture.
the seed transaction on the blockchain and collects all subsequent
transactions. It then determines temporal dependencies among
these transactions, resulting in a directed dependency graph. For
example, a transaction T2 temporally depends on a transaction T1
if T1 occurs before T2 on the blockchain and the execution of T1
affects the behavior of T2, say, by writing a variable that is read by
T2. Transactions that (transitively) depend on the seed transaction
should be captured in the generated automaton. All other trans-
actions are unrelated to understanding the target contract. Tab. 1
shows a list of relevant transactions for the smart contract from
Fig. 2, starting with the instantiation of the contract. As an example,
observe that T2 from Tab. 1 affects the behavior of T5 by writing to
location games[g1] that is read by T5.
It is common that several clients interact simultaneously with
an instance of a smart contract. In fact, the transactions in Tab. 1
come from four overlapping rock-paper-scissors games. In order
to obtain precise specifications, it is important to separate these
games into self-contained traces; otherwise, transactions T4 to T6
would, for instance, suggest that it is possible to call Bet three times
in a row and modify the hand of a player after it has been set.
To obtain this separation, we use the dependency graph to cluster
the relevant transactions into self-contained sessions. A session is
the longest sequence of transactions such that the transactions in
the session depend only on other (earlier) transactions in the same
session and on the seed transaction. In our example, we identify a
session for each of the four rock-paper-scissors games in Tab. 1.
The dependency graph and sessions are defined on the gran-
ularity of transactions since these are atomic operations on the
blockchain. Each transaction may include several contract invo-
cations. In order to obtain a precise automaton that also shows
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Table 1: A sequence of transactions with the
RockPaperScissors contract (of Fig. 2) starting from the
contract-creation transaction.
Transaction Contract Block
Identifier Invocation Number
1 contract creation 7
2 g1 = StartGame() 9
3 g2 = StartGame() 10
4 Bet(g2, 1, 3) 10
5 Bet(g1, 0, 1) 11
6 Bet(g1, 1, 2) 12
7 Claim(g1) 13
8 g3 = StartGame() 14
9 Claim(g2) 14
10 Bet(g3, 0, 3) 15
11 Bet(g3, 1, 1) 15
12 g4 = StartGame() 16
13 Bet(g4, 1, 1) 17
14 Bet(g4, 0, 1) 17
15 Claim(g4) 20
16 Claim(g4) 20
the contract interactions within a transaction, we decompose each
transaction into its individual invocations. Performing this decom-
position on a session yields a sequence of invocations, called history.
In Tab. 1, each transaction contains a single contract invocation, so
the transformation of sessions into histories is straightforward.
Constructing and optimizing the automaton. Once we have ex-
tracted a set of histories from the blockchain, we represent them as
a finite automaton. Histories here are sequences of contract invo-
cations, but our approach for constructing the automaton is more
general; it works for sequences of arbitrary events such as contract
invocations, internal function calls, or statement executions.
Each history can be represented trivially by an acyclic automaton
that represents a sequence of n events by a chain of n + 1 states.
In order to obtain more concise specifications, it is necessary to
apply abstractions, which may merge different events and, thereby,
facilitate the construction of smaller, cyclic automata.
Choosing suitable abstractions for the automaton construction is
difficult for two reasons. First, it depends on the intended purpose
of the generated automaton. A user of the target contract might
prefer a simple automaton that is easy to read and, thus, favor
coarse abstractions. On the other hand, an auditor might require
an increased precision when examining more subtle contract in-
teractions. Second, the space of possible abstractions is huge. For
instance, even for each argument of an event (such as parameter
and result values), there are numerous possible abstractions that
strike different cost-benefit ratios.
Instead of using fixed abstractions, we address this challenge by
optimizing the automaton according to a user-defined configuration.
This configuration could, for instance, favor readability (e.g., by
penalizing large automata) or precision (e.g., by penalizing large
information loss). Our technique iteratively adjusts the applied
abstractions to obtain a useful, or even optimal, result. This process
is depicted by the outer gray box in Fig. 3 and explained below.
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Signature: Bet
Value: 2a
4
Callee: 2b35E3b3...
Input@[4;36]: v0
Signature: Bet
Value: 2a
Callee: 2b35E3b3...
Input@[4;36]: v0
Signature: Bet
Value: 2a
5
Input@[4;36]: v0
Output: 0
Signature: Claim
Value: 0
Error: invalid opcode 0xfd
Input@[4;36]: v0
Output: 0
Signature: Claim
Value: 0
Figure 4: The output automaton for the RockPaperScissors
contract (of Fig. 2), based on the transactions of Tab. 1.
The automaton construction proceeds in three steps (see inner
gray box in Fig. 3). First, starting from the set of mined histories, we
apply event abstractions to each event in the histories, resulting in a
set of abstract histories. Event abstractions omit details of concrete
events, for instance, they might ignore certain result values or
abstract numerical parameters using standard abstract domains.
Second, the resulting set of abstract histories is represented by
a finite automaton. Third, this automaton is further simplified by
applying automaton moves, which express local, automaton-specific
abstractions such as merging two states.
To optimize the resulting automaton, we apply this construction
process iteratively, as follows. The event abstractions and automa-
ton moves are described by a so-called recipe; the initial recipe uses
the identity event abstraction and contains no automata moves. In
each iteration, we construct a candidate automaton Acand accord-
ing to the current candidate recipe. The subsequent sampling step
then computes a cost for the candidate automaton Acand based on
a user-defined configuration and remembers the best automaton
constructed so far. In search for an even better automaton, the sam-
pling applies a random variation to the recipe and proceeds using
this new candidate recipe. This process iterates until it reaches a
user-defined exploration bound, and returns the best automaton
so far. The user may then inspect the automaton and, if necessary,
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restart the process with an adjusted configuration to obtain a more
concise or a more detailed result.
For the running example, our tool chain produces the automaton
of Fig. 4 using a configuration that strikes a good balance between
readability and precision. This automaton is constructed based on
the transactions of Tab. 1; the events appear as edge labels.
The automaton shows that multiple games may be started con-
currently. The first StartGame event returns a variable v0 that rep-
resents the game identifier. The notation ∗v0 of the subsequent
StartGame events expresses that each new game has a different
identifier. Following the StartGame events, we have one or two con-
secutive invocations of Bet for a game v0, along the right and left
paths of the automaton, respectively. We then find a single suc-
cessful Claim event for v0. Here, the automaton shows that it is
possible to invoke Claim after only one Bet; this functionality is
needed to refund the bet amount if no second player participates
in the game and emerges because of g2 of Tab. 1. Observe that any
further invocations of Claim for the same gamev0 result in an error,
which is denoted by a self-loop in the automaton.
The automaton abstracts over the concrete result of StartGame
and the first parameters of Bet and Claim. It also abstracts away
the second and third parameters of Bet, while not abstracting the
transferred amounts of Ether (e.g., value 42 (0x2a) for invocations
of Bet). A characteristic of the automata that our technique gen-
erates is that each state is an accepting state, expressing that an
interaction with the target contract may terminate at any state.
For example, it is not necessary that a StartGame event is followed
by an invocation of Bet and Claim. Our construction ensures that
the resulting automaton over-approximates the histories extracted
from the blockchain. That is, each of these histories is accepted by
a run of the automaton.
In the following sections, we describe the main components
of our architecture in more detail and explain precisely how we
generate the automaton of Fig. 4.
4 MINING HISTORIES
The process of extracting histories from the blockchain starts by
locating the given seed transaction TS on the blockchain and col-
lecting all subsequent transactions. These transactions are then
processed in four major steps. First, to analyze the dependencies
among these transactions, we determine the read and write effects
for each of them (Sect. 4.1). Second, we use these effects to build
a dependency graph, which describes temporal dependencies be-
tween transactions that access the same state (Sect. 4.2). Third, we
remove any transactions that are unrelated toTS and, consequently,
to the target contract (Sect. 4.3). Fourth, we identify independent
sessions and then decompose the transactions of each session to
generate the histories of events that should be represented in the
constructed automaton (Sect. 4.4).
4.1 Collecting transaction effects
The automata we produce summarize those transactions on the
blockchain that are related to a given seed transaction; other trans-
actions are irrelevant and should be omitted to obtain concise spec-
ifications. Two transactions are related if they access the same
memory locations. Consequently, our analysis starts by collecting
the read and write effects of the seed and all subsequent transac-
tions. For this purpose, we execute each transaction on a local copy
of the blockchain and use hooks into the virtual machine to record
all memory accesses. This process obtains precise results, but is
time consuming. However, it needs to be performed only once for
each transaction on the blockchain; the results can be cached and
extended incrementally as the blockchain grows. Moreover, it is
often useful to mine only a small portion of the blockchain, for
instance, when an auction lasts at most one week.
In general a location is any persistent state that a transactionmay
access. However, many transactions access the balance of accounts.
These accesses introduce relationships between transactions that
are otherwise unrelated and should be ignored in the mined specifi-
cations. For instance, they relate a game a user plays with an invest-
ment they make. To avoid such spurious connections, we exclude
account balances from the locations we consider in the following.
Technically, this means that we (slightly) under-approximate the
effects of each transaction.
Definition 4.1 (Location). A location l ∈ L is any persistent state
that the execution of a transaction may access (i.e., read or write)
and that is not the balance of an account.
A location may, for instance, be an index to the persistent dic-
tionary of a smart contract or an attribute of the block in which
a transaction is contained, e.g., the block number or timestamp.
For instance, in the running example, g.pA and block.number are
locations accessed by transaction T5 (from Tab. 1). Using the above
definition, we can now define the effects of a transaction.
Definition 4.2 (Write effect). The write effect w(T ) ⊆ L of a trans-
action T is the set of locations that are written to during execution
of T .
For instance, the write effectw(T2) contains locations gC, g.pA,
g.pB, g.hA, g.hB, g.cS, and games[gC].
Definition 4.3 (Read effect). The read effect r (T ) ⊆ L of a trans-
action T is the set of locations that are read from during execution
of T , without having previously been written to by T .
For instance, the read effect r (T6) contains games[gid], g.cS,
block.number, g.hA, and g.hB. Since we will use effects to deter-
mine dependencies between different transactions, Def. 4.3 ignores
reads from a location that is previously written to by the same trans-
action. Consequently, if l ∈ w(T ) ∩ r (T ), then a read from l occurs
before a write to l during execution of T , e.g., g.hB ∈ w(T6) ∩ r (T6).
A transaction may read attributes of the block in which it is
contained (such as the block number). These attributes are up-
dated automatically when a block is appended to the blockchain.
In order to reflect these implicit write operations, our technique
inserts a ghost transaction right before the first transaction of every
block. The write effect of this ghost transaction contains all block
attributes. For instance, the ghost transaction for block 11, denoted
B11, writes to location block.number, which is then read by T5.
4.2 Building the dependency graph
We use read and write effects to compute two kinds of dependen-
cies between transactions, called strong and weak dependencies.
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Strong dependencies are used to determine the relevant transac-
tions, that is, the transactions that are related to the seed transaction
and, therefore, need to be reflected in the constructed automaton.
Weak dependencies help define the order in which the relevant
transactions may occur.
Definition 4.4 (Strong dependency). A transaction Tj strongly de-
pends on transaction Ti , denoted by Ti → Tj , if and only if (1) Ti
occurs before Tj on the blockchain and (2) Ti writes to a location
that Tj reads, and no transaction between Ti and Tj writes to that
location: (w(Ti ) ∩ r (Tj )) \ B , ∅, where B = ⋃k=i+1, ..., j−1w(Tk ).
Intuitively, a strong dependency reflects that the execution of Ti
affects the execution ofTj . Consequently, it indicates thatTi should
be included in the constructed automaton if Tj is (we will explain
the details in the next subsection). Moreover, if they are included,
the automaton must reflect that Ti occurs before Tj .
A weak dependency alone does not determine which transac-
tions to include in the automaton, but expresses an ordering con-
straint that needs to be reflected; changing the order of two weakly
dependent transactions may influence the result of the execution.
Definition 4.5 (Weak dependency). A transaction Tj weakly de-
pends on transactionTi , denoted byTi d Tj , if and only if (1)Ti oc-
curs beforeTj on the blockchain and (2)Ti writes to or reads from a
location thatTj writes, and no transaction betweenTi andTj writes
to that location: (w(Ti ) ∩w(Tj )) \ B , ∅ or (r (Ti ) ∩w(Tj )) \ B , ∅,
where B is defined as above.
We refer to strong and weak dependencies as temporal depen-
dencies; we use them to build a transaction dependency graph:
Definition 4.6 (Dependency graph). A dependency graph is a di-
rected graph, in which each node represents a transaction and each
edge a strong or weak dependency between two transactions.
The dependency graph generated by our tool chain for the run-
ning example is shown in Fig. 5. Notice that there is a strong depen-
dency T5 → T6 because function Bet of T5 writes to g.hA, which is
read by Bet of T6. However, there is a weak dependency T13 d T14
since Bet of T13 reads from g.hA, which is written to by Bet of T14.
There is also a weak dependency T9 d B15 (the ghost transaction
that is inserted by our technique right before the first transaction
of block 15), which indicates that function Claim of T9 reads from
location block.number, which is written to by B15.
4.3 Filtering irrelevant transactions
Intuitively, we consider a transaction to be relevant if: (a) It is
(directly or transitively) affected by the execution of the seed trans-
action, for example, a bid in an auction that was started by the seed
transaction. (b) It occurs after the seed transaction and it (directly or
transitively) affects the execution of an already relevant transaction
according to case (a), for instance, the transaction that initializes
the minimum price of an auctioned item before a bid is placed in
an auction that was started by the seed transaction. In order to
formalize this intuition, we first define transitive dependencies.
Definition 4.7 (Strong dependency path). A strong dependency path
from transactionTi toTj is denotedTi →∗ Tj and represents a non-
empty path from Ti to Tj consisting only of strong dependencies.
10_Bet_g3_p0_S
11_Bet_g3_p1_R
block_16
12_Start_g4
15_Claim_g4
16_Claim_g4
block_15
init
01_Creation
02_Start_g1
block_10
03_Start_g2
08_Start_g3
04_Bet_g2_p1_S
block_11
05_Bet_g1_p0_R
block_12
06_Bet_g1_p1_P
07_Claim_g1
block_13
block_14
09_Claim_g2
block_17
13_Bet_g4_p1_R
14_Bet_g4_p0_R
block_20
Figure 5: The dependency graph for the RockPaperScissors
contract (of Fig. 2), generated from the transactions of Tab. 1.
Each (non-ghost) node in the graph is annotated with the
corresponding transaction identifier followed by the con-
tract invocation with its arguments. The graph does not
show edges between nodes when these are implied by tran-
sitivity of the dependencies.
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Definition 4.8 (Weak dependency path). A weak dependency path
from transaction Ti to Tj is denoted Ti d∗ Tj and represents a
non-empty path from Ti to Tj consisting of any number of strong
dependencies and at least one weak dependency.
We remove all irrelevant transactions from the dependency
graph as described by the following definition.
Definition 4.9 (Filtered dependency graph). Given a dependency
graphG , a filtered dependency graph is generated fromG by remov-
ing any transaction T that does not fulfill either of the following
two conditions:
a. There exists a strong dependency path TS →∗ T .
b. There exists a weak dependency path TS d∗ T , and there exists
a transaction T ′ such that there exist strong dependency paths
T →∗ T ′ and TS →∗ T ′.
This definition closely matches the intuition given at the begin-
ning of this subsection. The requirement of a weak dependency
path in case (b) is motivated by the fact that without at least a weak
path, transactions TS and T would be unordered. If they were un-
ordered, T might as well have occurred before the seed transaction.
Therefore, considering T to be a relevant transaction would con-
tradict the role of the seed transaction as the “beginning of time”.
However, this requirement could in principle be dropped if a more
relaxed interpretation of the seed transaction was desired.
In the dependency graph of Fig. 5, we do not filter out the ghost
transaction B11 because it satisfies case (b) of the above definition: It
has a weak dependency on the seed T1 and the strong dependency
paths B11 → T5 and T1 →∗ T5. If Bet was not required to be
invoked within the betting period (line 22 of Fig. 2), there would
be no edge between B11 and T5, in which case transaction B11
would be filtered out. As another example, imagine that we create
a second instance of the rock-paper-scissors contract. Even if the
same players participated in games of both contracts, the accessed
locations would be disjoint because we exclude account balances
when determining read andwrite effects. As a result, all transactions
with the second instance of the contract would not depend on the
seed T1 and would be removed.
4.4 Generating histories of events
In the final phase of the history mining, our technique traverses
the filtered dependency graph to cluster its transactions into self-
contained sessions. The transactions in these sessions are then
decomposed to obtain histories of events. The events (that is, con-
tract invocations) are collected when our technique executes the
transactions on a local copy of the blockchain to compute their read
and write effects (see Sect. 4.1).
Sessions represent independent interactions with a contract, for
instance, different rock-paper-scissors games. Since strong depen-
dencies indicate that two transactions are related by influencing
each other’s execution, strongly dependent transactions belong to
the same session:
Definition 4.10 (Session). A session is the longest sequence of
transactions that have a strong dependency only on transactions
in the same session.
Intuitively, each transaction that is a sink in the graph with
respect to strong dependencies (called final transaction below) can
be placed in a separate session because no other transaction strongly
depends on it. A session containing a final transaction TF contains
all transactions T such that T →∗ TF .
Sessions are sequences of transactions, that is, ordered. The
mined specification should reflect all possible orderings of the trans-
actions in a session that are consistent with the executions extracted
from the blockchain. These orderings are reflected by the strong
and weak dependencies in the filtered dependency graph. We cap-
ture them by introducing potentially multiple sessions per final
transaction: one for each topological ordering of the transactions.
For instance, there are four final transactions in the dependency
graph of Fig. 5, namely T7, T9, T11, and T16, giving rise to the fol-
lowing four sessions. Note that the sessions for different final trans-
actions overlap, at least in the seed transaction.
S1 := [T1,T2,B11,T5,B12,T6,B13,T7]
S2 := [T1,T2,B10,T3,T4,B14,T9]
S3 := [T1,T2,B10,T3,B14,T8,B15,T10,T11]
S4 := [T1,T2,B10,T3,B14,T8,B16,T12,B17,T13,T14,B20,T15,T16]
Although weak dependencies are not considered when computing
which transactions should be included in a session, they are useful
in determining the ordering of transactions in sessions. For instance,
when computing session S1, observe that both B12 and T5 have a
strong dependency path to T6, but only the weak dependency from
T5 to B12 reflects in which order these transactions occur. Ignoring
such weak dependencies would lead to more sessions, some of
which might correspond to invalid executions.
It might be tempting to restrict the order of transactions in a
session to exactly the order in which they occur on the blockchain.
However, this approach would lead to sessions that reflect the
accidental ordering of unrelated transactions and, thus, miss other
orderings that would have been possible and, therefore, should be
shown in the mined specification.
Even though transactions are the atomic units of execution on the
blockchain, it is more informative to express specifications of smart
contracts on the level of individual events, in particular, contract
invocations. For this purpose, we decompose the transactions in
each session into its constituent events to obtain a set of histories:
Definition 4.11 (History). A history is a sequence of events that
occur during the execution of a session.
Note that we perform the filtering, clustering, and ordering on
the level of transactions and only then decompose the transactions
into events. Since the events within one transaction are typically
strongly dependent, performing the processing on the level of indi-
vidual events would not increase the precision of our specifications,
but lead to a much higher computational effort.
For the running example, we generate four histories of events
by replacing each transaction in the above sessions with the cor-
responding contract invocation (from Tab. 1). Note that a ghost
transaction does not contain any contract invocations.
5 AUTOMATON CONSTRUCTIONWITH
AUTOMATIC ABSTRACTION TUNING
Finding suitable abstractions to apply during the automaton con-
struction is difficult. As discussed earlier, not only is the space of
abstractions huge, but also the suitability of an abstraction depends
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Algorithm 1 Automaton construction with abstraction tuning.
1 procedure ConstructAndTuneAutomaton(H0, . . . , Hn )
2 Rcand ← IdentityEventAbstraction()
3 Copt ,Clst ←∞
4 Ropt ,Rlst ← Rcand
5 while ¬BoundReached() do
6 Acand ← ApplyAutomatonRecipe(H0, . . . , Hn , Rcand )
7 Ccand ← ComputeAutomatonCost(Acand )
8 if Ccand < Copt then
9 Copt ,Ropt ← Ccand ,Rcand
10 if Accept(Ccand ,Clst ) then
11 Clst ,Rlst ← Ccand ,Rcand
12 Rcand ←ModifyRecipe(Rlst )
13 return ApplyAutomatonRecipe(H0, . . . , Hn , Ropt )
14 procedure ApplyAutomatonRecipe(H0, . . . , Hn , R)
15 H ′0, . . . , H
′
n ← AbstractHistories(H0, . . . , Hn , R)
16 Atmp ← BuildAutomaton(H ′0, . . . , H ′n )
17 return ApplyAutomatonMoves(Atmp , R)
on the intended use of the automaton. To address these challenges,
our technique automatically tunes its abstractions to maximize the
user-defined configuration, like readability or precision.
Algorithm. Alg. 1 presents the automaton construction with
abstraction tuning. As shown in Fig. 3, it takes as input a set of
concrete histories and builds a candidate automaton Acand from
the input histories and a candidate recipe Rcand . Recall from Sect. 3
that a recipe is a sequence of event abstractions and automaton
moves. Event abstractions and automaton moves are applied as pre-
and post-processing steps of the actual automaton construction,
respectively (see procedure ApplyAutomatonRecipe). The actual
construction is straightforward and results in a tree-shaped au-
tomaton that precisely characterizes all (abstracted) input histories.
Cycles are introduced later, when automaton moves are applied.
The initial recipe consists only of the identity event abstraction.
Once the initial automaton has been constructed, our algorithm
tries to optimize it, according to a user-provided configuration. For
this purpose, it applies random variations to the recipe, hoping to
achieve a lower cost. A key insight of our algorithm is that these
variations are not applied to the best recipe seen so far, but to a
recent one. This approach allows the algorithm to explore recipes
that might temporarily increase the cost of the candidate automaton
but eventually lead the exploration away from a local minimum.
The algorithm keeps track of the current recipe (Rcand ), the best
recipe so far (Ropt ), and the recipe used for the next random varia-
tion (Rlst ), together with their associated costs. After computing a
candidate automaton, the algorithm compares its cost to the best
recipe so far and updates the information if a new best automaton
has been found. It then decides which recipe to accept as a basis for
the next iteration. Rcand is chosen if its cost is lower than the cost
for the previous Rlst ; even if the cost is higher, it is accepted with
a certain probability that decreases proportionally to how much
the cost increases as well as to how much time has elapsed. This
process allows the algorithm to steer away from local minima, but
also ensures that the exploration stabilizes over time. This iterative
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Figure 6: The cost of the automaton of Fig. 4 for the first 5000
sampling steps.
process, inspired by simulated annealing [35, 48], is stopped when
an exploration bound is reached, such as the maximum number of
iterations or a timeout. When stopped, the user is presented with
the best automaton so far.
Fig. 6 plots the cost of the automaton of Fig. 4 over the number
of sampling steps. Observe that our algorithm avoids several local
minima by allowing the cost to increase up to ∼50 before dropping
to 6.7. As the number of steps increases, the cost is allowed to
increase less. After 5,000 steps, the cost is ∼20, which is higher than
the best cost of 6.7 observed around step 3,100. As discussed earlier,
our algorithm returns the automaton with the best cost.
Cost metrics. The metrics used by our algorithm are essentially
a linear combination of readability, generality, and precision. In
particular, it is possible to penalize automata with many states and
edges to favor readability, to reward automata that describe more
histories than those directly observed on the blockchain to favor
generality, and to penalize automata that describe histories that
were not observed on the blockchain to favor precision.
Fig. 7 shows an automaton generated by our technique for the
rock-paper-scissors contract when the user configuration favors
simplicity and generality over precision. The automaton still shows,
for instance, that Claim events occur only after at least one Bet
event. However, it now allows one or more bets instead of one or
two, as in the more precise automaton from Fig. 4.
Event abstractions. Our technique represents events as records
whose fields store information about their occurrence at execution
time, for instance an Output field stores the return value of a contract
invocation, as in Fig. 4. In order to obtain concise automata, we
allow our algorithm to abstract from the details using the following
event abstractions. A recipe determines the abstraction per function
signature and event field.
– Identity abstraction: The value of the field is unchanged.
– Variable abstraction: The value is abstracted by a variable.
– Top abstraction: The value is abstracted away.
To obtain the automaton from Fig. 4, our technique applied, for
instance, the variable abstraction on the Output field of all StartGame
events. This means that the Output field of these events was each
assigned a fresh variable. These variables were then replaced by
a single variable v0 using an automaton move, which we describe
later. The top abstraction was applied on two input fields of all Bet
events, namely the player position and their hand, which is why
they are not shown in Fig. 4.
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01
Callee: v0
Output: v1
Signature: creation
2
Callee: 2b35E3b3...
Caller: 41620c1122415F047f3E
Output: v2
Signature: StartGame
Callee: 2b35E3b3...
Caller: 41620c1122415F047f3E
Output: *v2
Signature: StartGame
3
Callee: 2b35E3b3...
Input@[4;36]: v2
Output: 0
Signature: Bet
Value: 2a
Callee: 2b35E3b3...
Input@[4;36]: v2
Output: 0
Signature: Bet
Value: 2a
4
Callee: v0
Input@[4;36]: v2
Output: 0
Signature: Claim
Value: 0
Callee: v0
Error: invalid opcode 0xfd
Input@[4;36]: v2
Output: 0
Signature: Claim
Value: 0
Figure 7: A general automaton for the contract of Fig. 2.
It is possible to apply other abstractions like the standard nu-
merical abstractions of abstract interpretation or a byte-length ab-
straction that abstracts a value by its number of bytes, for example,
to denote the order of magnitude of assets. For simplicity, we focus
on the abstractions that we found most useful in our experiments.
Automaton moves. Event abstractions apply uniformly to all
event fields for a given function signature, for instance, the result
values of all invocations of Bet. It is also useful to apply abstrac-
tions more locally, depending on the context in the automaton. We
call such automaton-specific abstractions automaton moves. We fo-
cus on two important automaton moves in the following, merging
states and merging symbolic variables.
The automata constructed from abstract histories are tree-shaped
and may include long chains of states. To obtain more readable
automata, we merge states, which may join such chains and, more
importantly, introduce cycles and substantially reduce the total
number of states in an automaton.
Definition 5.1 (State merge). Given an automaton A and a func-
tion f from states to states, a state merge is a move that produces an
automaton A ′, where every state q is replaced by f (q) and every
transition q e7−→ r in A is replaced by f (q) e7−→ f (r ) in A ′.
Based on this definition, we present two instantiations of func-
tion f , which are based on the future of automaton states and are
used by our technique:
– Same bounded future: Given a state q in an automatonA, Lq
denotes the set of words accepted by A starting from q. For
k ∈ N, Lkq denotes the set of words that are prefixes of words
in Lq with length at most k . We consider two automaton
states q and r to have the same bounded future if Lkq = Lkr . To
merge states with the same bounded future, our technique
selects a random value for k and defines function f such that
f (q) = f (r ) if and only if Lkq = Lkr .
– Similar bounded future: We consider two automaton states
q and r to have a similar bounded future when Lkq ⊂ Lkr
or Lkr ⊂ Lkq . Our technique selects a random value for k
and defines function f such that f (q) = f (r ) if and only if
Lkq ⊂ Lkr or Lkr ⊂ Lkq .
Note that both variations of this automaton move potentially
make the resulting automaton very imprecise, for instance, if k is
very small. However, the subsequent evaluation of the cost metric
will detect such overly coarse abstractions and reject the recipe.
In Fig. 4, state 2 is the result of merging several states that led to
betting in the future.
As discussed above, an important event abstraction is to replace
concrete values by symbolic variables. It is often useful to track
relationships between different symbolic variables, especially, the
equality of variables. Since we need to relate symbolic variables
also across different histories, we cannot simply apply relational
abstractions. Instead, we define an automaton move that expresses
the equality of two symbolic variables by merging them.
Definition 5.2 (Variable merge). Given an automaton, a variable
merge is an automaton move that:
a. selects two distinct symbolic variables, v1 and v2, that appear in
event fields of the automaton;
b. replaces every occurrence of v2 by v1;
c. replaces v1 by ∗v1 in event fields where the variable is assigned
a different value, according to the concrete histories.
The last step is necessary to ensure that each history of con-
crete events is still characterized by the corresponding path in the
automaton. In our example, this move was repeatedly applied to
yield the automaton of Fig. 4, in which all StartGame events return
a unique game identifier and the subsequent Bet and Claim events
refer to the same identifier.
6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
So far, we have shown the usability of our technique on the rock-
paper-scissors contract. Here, we further evaluate its practicality on
several real-world contracts deployed on the Ethereum blockchain.
Setup. For our experiments, we selected nine popular contracts
from five categories that represent common applications of smart
contracts. In particular, we chose contracts that implement auctions,
gambling games, Ponzi schemes [12], tokens1, and wallets. An
overview of these contracts is shown in the first column of Tab. 2,
1Tokens allow clients to create and manage their own crypto-currency.
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Table 2: Results for history mining.
Contract LOC
Transactions Histories
Total Final Total AverageLength
ENS 606 1,859,823 274 60 10
Esports 129 767,655 54 16 16
Etherdice 976 708,244 664 80 134
PiggyBank 89 628,585 150 123 71
PonziKing – 1,163,028 45 7 14
BAT 175 26,276 69 30 61
REP – 21,101 65 3 23
TheDao 1,236 3,535 188 33 81
EthDev – 603,106 105 147 38
grouped by the above categories (in the same order). The second
column shows the lines of code for each contract, where available.
For each contract, we identified an interesting seed transaction
as input to our tool, in particular, a transaction that instantiates
the contract or one that marks the beginning of interesting inter-
actions, like the start of an auction. For all experiments, we set an
exploration bound of 10,000 recipes.
We ran the experiments on an Intel Xeon CPU E5-4627 v2 @
3.30GHz machine with 256GB of memory running the Ubuntu
operating system with Linux 4.4 kernel.
History mining. In Tab. 2, we evaluate the history mining com-
ponent of our tool chain. As shown in the table, the number of
final transactions that remain after filtering the dependency graphs
(fourth column) is only a small fraction of the total number of col-
lected transactions when starting from the seed (third column). This
shows the effectiveness of our technique in eliminating irrelevant
transactions and, thereby, obtaining precise specifications. At the
same time, the filtering retains sufficiently many transactions for
our tool to generate several histories (fifth column) of reasonable
average length (sixth column). On the other hand, the number of
histories is still manageable even though there are histories that
differ from each other only with respect to the order of their events.
As expected, the running time of the history mining is propor-
tional to the time it takes to execute the transactions on our copy of
the blockchain for collecting their effects. For the contracts shown
in Tab. 2, this time ranges from a few seconds (e.g., 11s for TheDao) to
several hours (e.g., 36h for ENS). On average, 50% of the total mining
time is spent on executing the transactions and collecting their read
and write effects, the other 50% on building the dependency graph,
filtering it, and generating histories. The former part becomes more
dominant as the number of transactions increases (e.g., 86% for ENS).
As we explained earlier, it is possible to cache the results of this
step and extend them incrementally as the blockchain grows.
Automaton construction and tuning. In our experiments, we used
three user configurations: one that strikes a good balance between
readability and precision (called the default configuration), one that
favors generality (general configuration), and one that favors preci-
sion (precise configuration).
In Tab. 3, we evaluate the automaton construction and abstrac-
tion tuning component of our tool chain. Columns 2–5 of the table,
labeled ‘Transitions’, show the number of transitions in the ini-
tial, default, general, and precise automata. As expected, the initial
Table 3: Results for automaton construction and tuning.
Contract Transitions Accepted Recipes Cost ReductionI D G P D G P D G P
ENS 87 20 20 20 74.7% 65.7% 83.4% 81.8% 86.1% 66.5%
Esports 65 21 20 32 73.3% 68.9% 82.5% 65.4% 83.7% 62.9%
Etherdice 463 37 81 460 78.0% 55.8% 86.6% 88.4% 91.3% 68.0%
PiggyBank 121 27 30 34 71.6% 60.0% 82.6% 77.2% 87.4% 49.3%
PonziKing 24 24 24 24 68.6% 51.0% 82.3% 30.7% 10.0% 58.4%
BAT 253 54 39 52 73.6% 74.8% 82.3% 86.8% 92.9% 59.5%
REP 66 20 35 35 53.9% 83.3% 75.7% 80.4% 73.5% 70.5%
TheDao 456 84 47 99 70.5% 69.2% 77.2% 78.5% 88.5% 77.7%
EthDev 121 67 46 21 80.8% 75.5% 61.2% 82.4% 82.1% 91.2%
automata are too large to be readable by a user (with up to 464
transitions for Etherdice), whereas the automata generated by the
default configuration of our tool contain an average of 39 transi-
tions. We can see that the number of transitions typically varies
for different configurations since the number of transitions is one
of the factors in the cost computation. For instance, for TheDao, the
general automaton contains the fewest number of transitions and
the precise automaton contains the most. However, since we also
consider other cost factors, the same does not always hold for other
smart contracts.
Columns 6–8, labeled ‘Accepted Recipes’, show the percentage
of recipes that are accepted by our optimization algorithm. Observe
that, even in the worst case, 51% of the generated recipes are ac-
cepted (for PonziKing) and, therefore, contributed to the exploration;
in the best case, this percentage goes up to 88.4% for Etherdice.
Columns 9–11, labeled ‘Cost Reduction’, show how much the cost
is reduced between the initial and the best automaton. For most
contracts, the cost reduction is high (on average 74.6% for the de-
fault configuration), which suggests that our technique is able to
effectively tune the automata based on the given cost configuration.
With a bound of 10,000 recipes, the running time of this tool com-
ponent is between 7secs (for PonziKing) and 551mins (for Etherdice).
The latter is, however, an outlier, which we attribute to the large
number of histories and their average length (Tab. 2). The final
automata for the majority of contracts and configurations are gen-
erated within less than ten minutes, despite the high exploration
bound we selected. We observed that, even with a much smaller
bound, the results are often comparable and generated within only a
few seconds for most contracts. In general, most of the running time
of this component is spent on computing a cost for each candidate
automaton.
To illustrate the effectiveness of our approach, we describe our
experience from generating the general automaton for the ENS auc-
tion. Even though the mining process starts out with almost two
million transactions, it produces a concise automaton with only
20 transitions. This automaton correctly shows that auctions are
started with an invocation of startAuctions. Bids may be placed by
calling newBid or startAuctionsAndBid, which can start an auction
and place a bid at the same time. Bids are then unsealed by invoking
unsealBid. The automaton shows also that, after an invocation of
unsealBid, no more bids are placed which ensures fairness of the
auction. After the bids are unsealed, the auction may be finalized
by calling finalizeAuction. We believe the automaton provides a
convenient way to extract and visualize such information even if
there are hundreds of different transactions.
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7 RELATEDWORK
Specification mining. The problem of specification mining is fun-
damental and well studied in the literature [56]. To the best of our
knowledge, this work is the first to apply specification mining in the
context of smart contracts. Early work on specification mining [16]
phrases the problem as learning finite-state machines from sets of
input/output pairs that partially describe their behavior. This early
work presents the k-tails heuristic, which merges states in order to
generalize from the given examples. In our setting, this heuristic
corresponds to the same-future state merge.
There are approaches that aim to simplify mining by restricting
what constitutes an automaton state [21, 53] or by defining discov-
erable patterns a priori [30–32], like the alternating pattern (ab)∗
(e.g., locking and unlocking resources) or the resource usage pattern
ab∗c (e.g., opening, reading, and closing files). Although scalable,
these approaches can miss interesting interactions between states.
More generally, work on specification mining may be classified
into dynamic and static approaches. Like our technique, dynamic
specification mining relies on having run the target program with
reasonable coverage. Applications of dynamic mining include soft-
ware revision histories [39], heap properties of object-oriented pro-
grams [22], component interactions [47], library APIs [36], system
logs [14], scenario-based system behaviors [26, 41–43], etc.
Static approaches are further subdivided into component- and
client-side mining. In component-side techniques, a specification is
mined by analyzing a component’s implementation [7, 49], whereas
client-side techniques generate a specification that reflects usage
patterns in a code-base [24, 46, 51, 59, 64, 65]. The two kinds of
approaches have been shown to complement each other [66].
Specification mining approaches may also be classified into
automaton-based (e.g., [20, 44]) and non-automaton-based ones
(e.g., [23, 25, 37, 38, 55, 68]). Process mining [63] is a non-automaton-
based technique, which dynamically records system events and
mines workflow graphs. These graphs, which are similar to petri-
nets, typically encode interactions of concurrent processes.
In contrast to existing work, our technique obtains precise speci-
fications with a novel dependency analysis that allows us to extract
sequential and self-contained traces from the blockchain. It also
gives users the flexibility to adjust the generated automata accord-
ing to their specific needs. To achieve this flexibility, we phrase
specification mining as an optimization problem by computing a
cost for each generated automaton and automatically tuning its
abstractions. We also introduce a novel abstraction that allows us to
capture relations between values occurring in different automaton
events and fields, like the value of the game identifier in the running
example. Our technique could easily be extended with additional
metrics. For instance, there could be scenarios where it is useful to
reduce rare state transitions by increasing their cost [9, 40].
Simulated annealing. The algorithm for simulated annealing was
first described by Metropolis et al. [48], but it was better detailed
many years later [19]. Although simulated annealing has been ap-
plied to optimization problems for a few decades already [35], it only
recently started being integrated with program analysis techniques
(e.g., [28, 29, 58]). We use simulated annealing for automatically
tuning automata that describe the functionality of smart contracts.
Program analysis for smart contracts. Smart contract code is
susceptible to bugs just like any other program, with the addi-
tional hazard of losing crypto-assets [11]. As a consequence, the
program-analysis and verification community has already devel-
oped several bug-finding techniques for smart contracts, includ-
ing debugging, static analysis, symbolic execution, and verifica-
tion [4, 5, 8, 15, 17, 18, 33, 34, 45, 52]. As mentioned earlier, analyz-
ing smart contracts poses further challenges due to their execution
model. For instance, users have no direct control over the order
in which transactions are processed by the miners, making smart
contracts susceptible to concurrency bugs [57]. These characteris-
tics had to be considered when designing our specification mining
technique (e.g., by exploring all possible orderings of transactions
when computing sessions).
8 CONCLUSION
We presented the first specification mining technique for smart
contracts. Our precise specifications provide important insights
into the functionality and interactions between smart contracts,
and are useful to develop, understand, and audit smart contracts.
Unlike existing work, our technique gives users the flexibility to
adjust the generated automata based on their needs during specific
usage scenarios. We achieve this by phrasing the problem of finding
useful abstractions for automaton construction as an optimization
problem with user-adjustable costs.
As future work, we plan to use our technique to identify common
design patterns and evolve the language design of smart contracts.
We also plan to apply the idea of cost-guided abstraction tuning to
other forms of program analysis, such as heap analyses, invariant
inference, and process mining.
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